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BOOK REVIEWS

HOW TO AVOID SUDDEN SHOCK
Schwartz, Peter. Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of Turbulence. New York: Gotham, 2003.
245pp. $27

The intelligence community is getting a
bad rap these days as it attempts to help
policy makers weather the myriad national security challenges in the Age of
Disruption. The controversy over weapons of mass destruction and protracted
post-conflict insurgency in Iraq are
only two incidents in a series of surprises. Whether it is the demise of the
Soviet Union, economic collapses in
Southeast Asia, the development of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan,
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, terrorist attacks on the United
States, or the subsequent anthrax attacks, being taken by surprise is becoming the norm.
Peter Schwartz, however, was not
knocked for a loop by many of these
events—in some cases he predicted
them. Schwartz is an expert at avoiding
surprises. Starting with his work with
Royal Shell in the 1970s, his efforts with
the Pentagon’s eighty-year-old futurist
and director of the Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, and the U.S.
National Security Commission in the
last decade, up to his present consulting
work with the Global Business Network,
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Schwartz has made a career out of helping clients avoid strategic surprises. He
does not necessarily make forecasts, but
he does predict that denial, defensiveness, and ignorance are the principal
preceptors for sudden shock.
Schwartz’s specialty is researching the
innumerable drivers and wild cards in
our environment from which he can
craft scenarios that will help strategic
planners and decision makers anticipate
crises well before they happen. He is no
stranger to naval readers, who will be
familiar with his The Art of the Long
View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (Currency, 1991), once
required reading at the Naval War College. In Inevitable Surprises, Schwartz
points out that we will face numerous
sharp jolts or major discontinuities in
political, military, and economic areas.
“If anything,” he notes, “there will be
more, not fewer, surprises in the future,
and they will all be interconnected.”
These interconnected surprises, which
Schwartz calls discontinuities, will
bring about a different world, one in
which the rules of the game are fundamentally altered. The critical value of
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this work is the author’s belief that
many of these discontinuities have their
roots in ongoing trends and that we can
anticipate them. By realizing what today’s driving forces are, we can alter
our perception about today’s emerging
realities, anticipate the consequences,
and avoid surprise.
Schwartz offers a simple process for
thinking anew and avoiding major
shocks. The first step is to pay attention
and identify and monitor the driving
forces that influence tomorrow’s world,
get ahead of the so-called inevitable
surprises, and prepare for them. The
second step is to remove ourselves from
the rigid mental paradigms about what
is fixed and what can be changed in the
landscape. The final step is to envision
new strategies for dealing with new
circumstances.
Most of this book discusses macro-level
factors in terms of social, economic,
and technological change. Some of the
discontinuities Schwartz deals with in
chapter-length detail include: dramatic
extension in human longevity based on
improvements in medical science, with
substantial influences on retirement, social institutions, and the political power
of influential centenarians; a “great
flood” of immigration with resultant
social tensions in China, Europe, and
the United States; continued economic
growth in the developing world and a
return to what Schwartz called the
“long boom,” predicated upon the enhanced productivity of the Information
Age and the updated critical infrastructure that undergirds it; a series of interrelated breakthroughs in science and
technology, especially nanotechnology,
biomaterials, and regenerative medicine,
quantum computers, and fuel cells; and
a few environmental crises, including the
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impact of global climate warming and
the coming of a great plague.
Military professionals and policy analysts will be particularly interested in
Schwartz’s range of geopolitical scenarios. In one scenario, the European
Union consolidates into an effective
bloc and begins to challenge what it
perceives as America the rogue superpower. China also grows in political
and military muscle, and it too seeks to
check the global dominance and influence of the United States. On the other
extreme, Schwartz paints a scenario of
American preeminence, including complete dominance of space with instant
global strike. In this scenario, because
the benefits of a benign superpower are
shared, a quiet and sustained Pax
Americana emerges.
Before anyone gets complacent about
American preeminence, read chapter 5,
in which the author details the dismal
prospects of the near future. His “catalog of disorder” includes an updated
version of the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse, beginning with terrorism,
religious wars—including evangelical
Christianity in Africa—criminal statehood in Mexico, ethnic conflict, and
HIV/AIDS. Schwartz’s grasp of the interrelated nature of many of these depressing transnational problems is
masterful. His grim projections of such
disorders are largely predetermined,
thus inevitable and therefore troubling.
These future flashpoints are all too
rarely identified as issues in the national
security community until U.S. military
forces are dispatched to provide some
form of stability.
Inevitable Surprises is well worth anyone’s time, as long as the reader understands that predicting is like planning—
it is not the prediction or the plan itself
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that is important but the diligent process of identifying drivers and developing scenarios that is invaluable. To
paraphrase Helmuth von Moltke, no
forecast survives contact with reality;
good forecasters, like good planners,
excel because they have gone through
the rigorous intellectual process of examining the mental geography of a
problem and anticipating the various
contours and conditions that could arise.
Read this book only if you would like to
avoid being surprised by tomorrow’s
predictable discontinuities.
FRANK HOFFMAN

Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia

Gray, Colin S. The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the
New World Order. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2004. 232pp. $29.95

What role should the United States play
in contemporary international politics?
This question, or rather debate, began
at the end of the Cold War and has
never really concluded. It is a unique
debate because while everyone disagrees
on the question, all agree on its substance—the United States is the preeminent power in the world. People refer
to the United States by various names:
the lone superpower, the unipolar moment, Pax Americana, and from some
of its erstwhile allies and former enemies, the unilateral hegemon or
hyperpower. All such names try to capture the signal fact that America carries
tremendous weight in world affairs,
though for obvious reasons everyone
interprets the implications differently.
In the United States, two different
groups dominate the contemporary
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study of strategy: defense analysts and
scholars of international security. In
both fields most writers seem content
to work on very specific problems. Defense analysts tend to emphasize what
many have called the Revolution in
Military Affairs or military transformation, while many in international security still contend for a theory-driven
approach to international conflict.
However, despite the fact that strategy
bridges politics and war, defense analysts narrowly focus on the details of
defense policies to the exclusion of the
larger political issues. On the other
hand, security theorists miss even the
most basic issues pursuing theoretical
elegance and, consequently, tend to
write only for one another. Colin Gray
avoids the pitfalls of each approach in
The Sheriff.
Colin Gray is professor of international
politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior
fellow of the National Institute for
Public Policy in Virginia. He has written extensively on strategy, geostrategy,
and defense policy, and has long been
connected to the defense establishments
of the United States and NATO. Many
of his former students are working in
both places and in the academy today.
Gray begins this work by trying to understand some of the major issues facing the United States in the post-post–
Cold War era and finishes by noting it
is the little things that imperiled everyone’s ability to see the larger picture. “I
found that so much about the U.S. role
in the world is coming into contention,
that were I to devote most of my pages
to military issues, as long intended, I
would be analyzing secondary issues
while leaving matters of first-order significance insufficiently addressed.” It is
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